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Anonymity Networks and 
Access to Information 
During Conflicts: Towards 
a Distributed Network 
Organisation
Abstract: Access to information is crucial during conflicts and other critical events such as 
population uprisings. An increasing number of social interactions happen in the cyberspace, 
while information exchanges at the infrastructural level (monitoring systems, sensor networks, 
etc.) are now also based on Internet and wireless links rather than ad hoc, isolated wired 
networks. However, the nature of the Internet allows powerful hostile actors to block, censor, 
or redirect communication to and from specific Internet services, through a number of available 
techniques.
Anonymity networks such as Tor provide a way to circumvent traditional strategies for 
restricting access to online resources, and make communication harder to trace and identify. 
Tor, in particular, has been successfully used in past crises to evade censorship and Internet 
blockades (Egypt in 2011, and Iran in 2012). Anonymity networks can provide essential 
communication tools during conflicts, allowing information exchanges to be concealed from 
external observers, anonymised, and made resilient to imposed traffic controls and geographical 
restrictions. However, the design of networks such as Tor makes them vulnerable to large-scale 
denial of service attacks, as shown by the DDoS targeted at Tor hidden services in March 2015.
In this paper, we analyse the structural weaknesses of Tor with regard to denial of service attacks, 
and propose a number of modifications to the structure of the Tor network aimed at improving 
its resilience to a large coordinated offensive run by a hostile actor in a conflict scenario. In 
particular, we introduce novel mechanisms that allow relay information to be propagated in 
a distributed and peer-to-peer manner. This eliminates the need for directory services, and 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The nature of computer network protocols allows, in principle, a fairly straightforward 
geographical and organisational mapping of senders and receivers. This can be done both 
for more restricted local or wireless networks, as well as for the whole Internet. On a large 
scale, it is thus possible for a government or an Internet service provider to localise, filter, and 
monitor data streams directed to a specific web service or to a specific geographical region. 
Several governments effectively control, monitor, or censor Internet traffic, either during crises 
or permanently. Internet protocols have not been designed for privacy and anonymity, and 
therefore Internet users can also be easily traced and identified.
This reality has prompted researchers to develop privacy enhancing technologies and 
anonymity networks, which allow communication to be concealed from external observers, 
anonymised, and made resilient to control and restrictions. Tor (the ‘onion router’) is arguably 
the most successful and widespread anonymity network, counting millions of users [10]. The 
Tor network is independently developed, and runs on a number of volunteer-operated servers. 
However, development of the Tor software has been funded by a number of governmental 
organisations, including US Department of State, DARPA, and the Naval Research Laboratory, 
as well as the Federal Foreign Office of Germany.1 This reflects the interest governments 
around the world have in anonymity networks, which are often seen as both a useful tool and a 
potential threat [2]. These conflicting sentiments are well exemplified by the discovery in 2007 
by security researcher Dan Egerstad that a number of embassies around the world used Tor for 
delivering private messages, in order not to rely on the hosting country network infrastructure, 
while the same governments restricted use of Tor by their own citizens [10].
Access to information is critical during conflicts and crises, when controls and restrictions 
on the flow of information over the Internet are more likely to be imposed [1]. In particular, 
the ability to use and deploy anonymity networks can be crucial for enabling communication, 
especially in hostile settings.
A. Onion routing
The Tor anonymity network is built on the concept of onion routing. Onion routing was first 
proposed in 1997 [8], but found widespread use only when implemented in the Tor software 
in 2002 [5]. The main aim of an onion routing network is to protect users from surveillance 
and traffic analysis. The identity, location, and network activity of the user are protected 
by concealing from external observers both the content and routing information of the 
communication. An onion routing network is therefore a general purpose infrastructure allowing 
allows the deployment of Tor-like networks in hostile environments, where centralised control 
is impossible. The proposed improvements concern the network organisation, but preserve the 
underlying onion routing mechanism that is at the base of Tor’s anonymity.
Keywords: Tor, anonymous networks, peer-to-peer, denial of service, DDoS
1 The full list of funders of the Tor project is available on the project’s web page: https://www.torproject.org/
about/sponsors.html.en [January 4, 2016]
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private communications over a public network. It provides anonymous connections that are 
strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. This is achieved by relaying the 
user’s traffic, including information about its destination, through virtual circuits composed 
of three successive relays. In particular, each relay in the circuit only learns the preceding and 
following step in the path from the user to the destination: because of this, the user remains 
anonymous to all relays except the first as well as the destination, while the destination of 
the communication remains secret to all relays except the last. Messages are also repeatedly 
encrypted in a layered manner, in order to protect the actual content of the communication: 
a public key encryption scheme is used to encrypt the communication multiple times, using 
in inverse order the public keys of all the relays in the circuit. Traffic going back from the 
destination to the user is similarly encrypted, and routed back from the last relay to the first one.
B. Onion routing during crises
Social media have become an increasingly important mean of communication during crises. In 
recent years, social media were used extensively in a number of crises, conflicts and uprisings, 
including the ‘April 6 Youth Movement’ in Egypt in 2008, the post-election crisis in Iran in 
2009, the student protests in Austria in 2009, and the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and 
subsequent years part of the larger Arab Spring phenomenon [11]. In all these crises, internet 
censorship was deployed to prevent access to social media, and anonymity networks played 
a role in re-enabling access to censored resources, influencing how people and other actors 
organised online, and ultimately behaved on the streets.
In particular, Tor was used extensively, showing both its strengths and weaknesses. The Tor 
network, and consequently the onion routing mechanism, proved to be an effective way of 
circumventing restrictions and internet blockades, while protecting the identity of its users and 
the secrecy of the communication. However, the open nature of relay servers, which are publicly 
advertised, make them vulnerable to targeted attacks that can only be partially mitigated by 
using bridges (servers allowing access to the Tor network when direct communication with 
a relay is impossible). The Tor infrastructure is also limited by the relatively small number of 
active relays and its semi-centralised structure, which promotes running relays as dedicated 
servers as opposed to a more distributed, peer-to-peer network organisation [9]. This makes 
it impossible to use onion routing over local (wireless) networks, which can be potentially 
deployed on the spot during a crisis using low-cost, low power devices.
Recent events demonstrated that a different implementation of onion routing based on a 
decentralised network structure might be more suited for crises and conflict areas, where Tor-
like networks need to be deployed in hostile environments, and where centralised control is 
impossible.
C. Onion routing in Wireless Sensor Networks
Another field of application for onion routing is Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). A WSN 
is composed of a number of sensors, communicating with each other through a wireless 
channel, and deployed in an environment where they observe physical phenomena [6]. They 
are being used in a number of military application scenarios, for purposes including monitoring 
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and intelligence. WSN are therefore often deployed in hostile or difficult settings, such as 
battlefields or conflict areas, and are therefore required to be highly fault tolerant, scalable and 
decentralised. Because of this, WSN are increasingly designed around a distributed network 
structure and peer-to-peer primitives, to enhance scalability and resilience [7].
Particularly in hostile settings, the security of the communication within the WSN is of 
paramount importance. Base stations, which are special network nodes that collect data 
gathered by the other sensors nodes in the WSN, are a central point of failure. It is therefore 
crucial to make them hard to distinguish from regular nodes. This can be achieved by hiding 
information on their location and identity (known as context information) within the network 
[3]. Context information can be protected by employing anonymous routing, and encrypting the 
communication. In particular, onion routing can be used in a WSN to prevent adversaries from 
learning the network topology using traffic analysis, and therefore preserve context privacy [4]. 
However, this requires protocol and mechanisms allowing the deployment of onion routing 
over the decentralised, peer-to-peer network structures at the base of current WSN.
D. Outline of the paper
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.A, we present the challenges of implementing a 
full onion routing mechanism in distributed networks, and in particular the fact that nodes in a 
network have limited visibility of the network itself. In Section 2.B, we introduce a novel data 
structure, called visibility filter that enables the sharing of information regarding node visibility 
across the network in a secure and distributed manner. We present the strategy used to distribute 
the filters in Section 2.C. Based on the visibility filter structure, we propose an onion routing 
circuit selection mechanism in Section 2.D. Finally, in Section 2.E we analyse the security of 
the proposed construction, and in Section 2.F we discuss the communication overhead of the 
scheme.
2. ONION ROUTING OVER DISTRIBUTED NETWORKS
In the Tor network, clients learn about the currently available relays by downloading the list of 
running relays from directory authorities. Directory authorities are a small subset of relays that 
collect and distribute routing information in the network [5]. This information is used by the 
clients when building a circuit, in order to decide which relays to select. Directory information, 
however, also allows any party (including an attacker) to learn the complete list of relays. The 
Tor network is based on distributed trust: as the network is open (in the sense that anybody 
with a sufficiently fast Internet connection can run a relay), it should be hard for a single person 
or organisation to control large parts of the network. For this reason, directory authorities are 
selected among long-running, established network nodes. Similarly, the first hop in any circuit 
built over the Tor network is restricted to being selected among the list of entry guards [5]. 
Both flags (directory authority and entry guard) can be earned by relays after a certain time of 
continuous operation, proving their stability. This design serves two main purposes: reducing 
the risk of end-to-end correlation for any given circuit, that is, the chance that both the first and 
last hop in a circuit are controlled by an adversary; and raising the start-up cost for the adversary. 
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Without entry guards, the attacker could introduce relays into the network and immediately 
start having chances to act as first hop. With entry guards, new adversarial relays need to earn 
the guard flag before they can act as first hop, and the limited number of selected entry guards 
can prevent attackers from gaining a guard flag for a significant number of relays [12],[13].
While the directory structure and entry guards help protect the privacy of the users, they also 
expose the Tor network to (distributed) denial of service (DDoS) attacks. As the list of relays 
and their role is publicly available, an attacker with sufficient resources can target enough relays 
to entirely disrupt network operation [15], as shown by the large scale DDoS attack targeted 
at Tor hidden services in March 2015. Worse still, instead of a blanket denial of service attack, 
an adversary may decide to selectively target relays that are not compromised (or under their 
control) in order to redirect users to systems one has access to, thus increasing the probability of 
compromising anonymity [14]. While detection of denial of service attacks is possible [16], and 
some basic countermeasures such as using client puzzles to mitigate their effect on the network 
exist [17], DDoS still pose a major threat to Tor, and any other onion routing network based on 
a similar semi-centralised structure.
A. Challenges of distributed networks
In this paper, we propose a general mechanism for achieving onion routing over a distributed 
and decentralised network, including network structures organised according to a peer to peer 
paradigm. Peer to peer (P2P) networks are in fact large decentralised and distributed systems. 
The design of distributed networks generally follows three main principles: decentralisation, 
in that peers operate without any central coordination; fault tolerance, or being able to 
accommodate nodes joining, leaving, or failing during network operation without a disruption 
of service; and scalability, the property of functioning efficiently for any given number of 
nodes. Distributed networks are the most efficient and reliable network organisation where 
network access is limited or restricted. They can allow local nodes to connect to each other, 
and can be deployed in hostile environments where centralised control is impossible. They are 
also inherently better suited to coping with denial of service attacks. For this reason, they can 
be effectively used during conflicts and crises, whether for dedicated networks such as wireless 
sensor networks or local wireless communication, or overlay networks providing a secure layer 
over an insecure or openly adversarial network, including the Internet.
However, onion routing cannot be directly implemented over distributed and peer to peer 
networks without modification. In fact, onion routing makes two important assumptions 
about the organisation of the underlying network: first, it is assumed that all relays are able to 
communicate with each other; and second, the Tor directory structure requires that a list of all 
relays active across the network can be created and maintained. Neither of those assumptions 
can be satisfied in a distributed network. In a peer to peer setting, nodes do not generally have 
a full view of the network; that is, they only know a subset of other nodes in the network, 
called neighbours. In fact, nodes are often unable to connect to most other nodes due, for 
instance, to NATs, firewalls, or, in the case of wireless networks, signal reach). The reduced 
network visibility means that no node or set of nodes can create with certainty a list of all 
nodes participating in the network at any given time. This prevents the creation of a directory 
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structure, informing nodes of the potential relays with which to create a circuit. However, while 
in Tor the roles of client and relay are generally distinct, it is possible to assume that all nodes 
in the distributed networks can act as relay. In this setting, nodes can create circuits where the 
first relay is one of their neighbours. However, this poses a second problem: how can we select 
following relays, considering that the client node has no knowledge of the network outside its 
neighbours? This is especially important, as we want to avoid circuits that are too local – that 
is, that are entirely comprised of neighbours of the client node – in order to avoid partitioning 
the network. At the same time, we cannot trust relays to select the following steps in the circuit, 
as doing that would mean that a compromised first hop would be able to influence the creation 
of the whole circuit, and include only relays under the control of the attacker, thus breaking the 
user’s security.
In order to address this issue, we introduce a mechanism based on controlled flooding and a 
Bloom filter based data structure, which allows the distribution of relay information among 
nodes (see Section 2.B). The Bloom filter structure, which we call visibility filter, stores 
information on the neighbours of each relay (and therefore node) in a privacy-preserving way. 
This information is spread across the local portion of the network through a depth-limited 
flooding mechanism, where each node transmits its own filter to the neighbours, and at the same 
time relays the filters received from the neighbours for a limited number of hops, corresponding 
to the expected length of the circuit (generally 3). The visibility filter structure addresses both 
assumptions necessary to achieve onion routing: first, it allows relays to learn which other 
relays they can build a circuit with, without having to learn the relay identities; and second, it 
supersedes the directory structure and therefore the necessity to compile a list of all relays. The 
mechanism is introduced in the following section.
Several attempts have been made to combine mix-net based anonymity networks and P2P. 
Morphix [22], proposed in 2002, is a peer-to-peer based anonymity network that provides a 
collusion detection mechanism against an adversary running multiple nodes. However, since 
the mechanism is based solely on a node’s local knowledge, the collusion detection mechanism 
can be broken, rendering the network insecure [23]. ShadowWalker, proposed in 2009, is a P2P 
anonymous communication system that aims at being low-latency in nature [24]. However, 
ShadowWalker circuits are constructed following a traditional random walk strategy that does 
not address the problem of making sure that not all nodes are in close proximity to the originating 
peer. Other anonymous routing protocols have been designed for specific P2P network 
topologies. Salsa [21], NISAN [25] and Torks [26] are all based on the common Distributed 
Hash Table (DHT) topology. However, the lack of anonymity in their lookup mechanisms may 
enable an adversary to infer the path structure [27]. In this paper, we propose a solution for 
implementing onion routing on a peer to peer network, independently of the network topology 
and structure. Our strategy doesn’t require risky network lookups, and ensures that the circuits 
are not local to the originating node.
B. Bloom filters and visibility filters
A Bloom filter (BF) is a space-efficient data structure representing a set [18]. A BF generated for 
a set allows the determination, without knowledge of the set itself, of whether an element is in 
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the set or not, with a probability of false positives p. A Bloom filter can be represented as a binary 
string of length n, initially all set to 0, and a set of hash functions whose outputs are uniformly 
chosen in {1, …, n}. During the creation of the filter, all the elements in the originating set are 
given as input to each hash function recursively, and bits in the filter corresponding to the output 
of each hash are set to 1; that is, if for instance one of the hash functions returns the value 5 
for an element of the set, the 5th bit of the Bloom filter string is set to 1. A Bloom filter can 
be queried in the same way; we determine whether an element is part of the originating set by 
passing its value to the hash functions and reading the bits corresponding to their outputs. If one 
or more bits have value 0, the element is not part of the set. If instead all bits have value 1, the 
element is part of the set, minus a false positive probability p. A false positive happens when 
all the values have been set to 1 during the filter creation by other elements (an event called 
collision), and not by the element of the query.
 
FIGURE 1: BLOOM FILTER CONSTRUCTION. IN THE PICTURE, THREE ELEMENTS {1,3,4} ARE 
ENCODED IN THE FILTER. THE FILTER HAS LENGTH n=10, AND THREE HASH FUNCTIONS ARE 
USED
We can construct a Bloom filter for each node, containing information on the neighbours of the 
node itself. The filter can be then used by a third node (that is, a node that is not a neighbour of 
the first node) to determine whether there is a ‘route’ between the two nodes: in other words, 
whether there is a node that is a neighbour of both nodes, allowing them to communicate. This 
filter, which we call visibility filter, can be used when building an onion routing circuit in order 
to verify that all hops in the circuits are able to communicate with the previous and next hop.
In practice, we assume that each node possesses an identifier unique over the network. The filter 
is then built over the set of all identifiers corresponding to the neighbours of the node for which 
the filter is being built. A node can verify the existence of a common neighbour with a node 
for which it has the visibility filter following a two-steps procedure. First, the node performs a 
XOR operation over the received filter and its own. If the resulting intersection filter has less 
than n bits of value 1, then no common neighbour is possible for the properties of Bloom filters. 
If the number of bits with value 1 is greater or equal to n, then the node proceeds to test each 
of its neighbours against the other node’s filter. Neighbours satisfying the filter are common 
neighbours, minus a false positive probability p.
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C. Distribution of visibility filters
In order to maintain their effectiveness in a constantly changing network, visibility filters need 
to be recreated and distributed at regular time intervals. We propose to distribute filters across 
the network using a controlled network flooding mechanism. Following this strategy, each node 
transmits its own visibility filter to all its neighbours. The identifier of the node is appended 
to the filter to allow identification of the filter origin (to guarantee integrity and prevent filter 
forging, the filter can be also signed using the node key pair), as well as a counter flag, called 
TTL (Time To Live) with value equal to the number of relays in an onion circuit (which defaults 
to 3). The neighbours will decrease the TTL flag by one, and further forward it to their own 
neighbours. This process is repeated by all nodes receiving the filter until the TTL reaches 0 
(see Figure 2).
While this process involves a communication overhead on the network for filter distribution, 
it is important to notice that each node benefits from learning as many filters (and therefore 
potential relays) as possible, in order to enhance the variety of its relay list and therefore 
mitigate risks posed by adversarial relays. At the same time, limiting the distribution of the 
filters to the nodes within reach for circuit building reduces the network overhead. We discuss 
the network overhead in detail in Section 2.F. 
  
FIGURE 2: A SCHEMATIC OF THE LIMITED FLOODING MECHANISM USED FOR DISTRIBUTING 
THE VISIBILITY FILTER. THE TTL VALUE LIMITS THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FILTER ONLY TO 
THOSE NODES THAT CAN BE INCLUDED IN A CIRCUIT
D. Onion circuit creation
Once a node obtains a sufficient number of filters, it can start creating onion circuits for 
communication. A circuit is created using a trial and error strategy. The ‘client’ is the node 
(either a user’s device or an autonomous system such as a sensor) which wants to communicate 
in a secure and private manner; it is, in fact, a client connecting to the service provided by the 
onion routing network. Communication originating from the client should reach an intended 
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destination over an onion circuit, of which the client knows the identifier and visibility filter. We 
assume that the destination is a node of the network. The circuit is built as follows:
1. The client selects a first potential relay for the circuit among its neighbours.
2. Then, the client selects all filters received from neighbours other than the selected 
first relay. This ensures that the circuit will not be one artificially suggested by the 
relay itself through manipulation of the filter distribution. 
3. Among the eligible filters, the client selects those that satisfy the identifier of the 
destination node as potential last relays. This step ensures that the eventual last relay 
will be able to communicate with the destination.
4. The client selects a random relay among the potential last relays. Then, it calculates 
the intersection between the filters of the potential first and last relay (using a XOR 
operation): if the number of resulting bits with value 1 is greater than n, a common 
neighbour exists (minus false probability p). Otherwise, the client selects a different 
relay and repeats the last step of the process. In practice, this step ensures that the 
first and last relay will be both able to communicate with at least one common third 
relay, which will be the middle relay of the circuit.
5. Once two compatible first and last relays are found, the client instructs the first relay 
to try to build a circuit by sending to it the intersection filter that will be used to 
identify the common middle relay.
6. The first relay builds the first part of the circuit by connecting to one of its neighbours 
which satisfies the received intersection filter (the middle relay).
7. Then, the client uses the incomplete circuit to communicate with the middle relay, 
and instructs it to complete the construction of the circuit by connecting to the last 
relay.
The circuit creation process enables nodes in a distributed network to reliably build onion 
circuits without relying on a centralised directory structure. This is made possible by the 
combined used of visibility filters and a decentralised mechanism for the distribution of relay 
information.
E. Sybil attacks and security considerations
In general, all distributed and peer to peer networks are vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where the 
adversary generates malicious nodes in the network in such a way that the target node in most 
network communication is in some way dependent on them [19]. Sybil attacks are the computer 
network equivalent of a siege; attack targets are generally surrounded by malicious entities, 
with the notable difference that there is generally no way to distinguish malicious nodes from 
honest ones, thus making detection of Sybil attacks more difficult. The general strategy for 
mitigating the effects of a Sybil attack is to limit the reliance of nodes on their neighbour for 
communication; if the attacker needs to control or deploy nodes across the whole network, the 
cost of the attack consequently increases [20].
The circuit creation protocol we propose in this paper achieves reduced locality of the circuit, 
thanks to the selection of potential relays; neighbours are excluded from acting as second 
272
or third relay, and third relays are selected from those whose information was not originally 
received from the selected first relay (thus preventing the creation of circuits influenced by a 
single node). While perfect security against Sybil attacks is generally impossible to achieve, 
these measures mitigate the impact of such attacks, and therefore increase the privacy and 
security of the user.
The circuit building mechanism also uses an intelligent selection strategy for relays following 
the first in order to minimise the impact of a malicious first relay. In fact, at step 2, the client 
excludes from the set of potential second relays those nodes whose filter was received from 
the selected first relay. This ensures that a malicious first relay will not be able to influence the 
selection of the following nodes in the circuit.
F. Performance considerations
In terms of network performance and overhead, the main deviation of the proposed scheme 
from the classical onion routing implementation is the additional requirement of distributing 
the visibility filters among nodes. In this Section, we describe why the limited flooding strategy 
we propose is realistic and introduces only limited overhead.
In general, peer-to-peer networks adopt different strategies for distributing or searching for 
information among peers. The concept of flooding was introduced by the Gnutella 2000 search 
protocol [28]. In practice, a node looking for a specific resource over the network broadcasts 
its query to its neighbours. If a neighbour does not have the resource, it forwards the query 
to its own neighbours. This is repeated until the resource is found, or all the nodes have been 
contacted. This naïve approach scales very poorly in large networks. For this reason, several 
alternative approaches have been proposed and implemented in subsequent networks that 
modify the flooding behaviour [29]. The main issue with network flooding is the high network 
use it can generate. This, combined with the uncertainty of the timing of queries (especially 
when user generated) can result in a significant overhead. In the proposed scheme, we address 
this by adopting a smart flooding strategy that limits the impact of the visibility filter distribution 
over the network. In particular, we limit the depth of the flooding (that is, the number of times 
a filter is relayed). This restricts the communication to a small portion of the network, and 
consequently greatly reduces network use. We can safely do so because we know exactly how 
far the information should be transmitted: as relays will only communicate with neighbouring 
relays, the distance coincides with the length of a circuit. At the same time, we can control the 
timing of the flooding, thus preventing network overload. In fact, we can define regular interval 
at which the nodes in the network should transmit their filters, and can decide to limit this 
further by only transmitting filters if there is a significant change in the neighbour’s set. New 
nodes entering the network can request a cached set of filters from their neighbouring nodes, 
which can easily keep them until a new transmission due to the very limited space requirements 
of Bloom filters.
We can estimate the network use of the limited flooding strategy. If we assume that each node 
has 100 neighbours, the size of the filer will be 839 bytes (for a false positive probability 
of less than one in a million, or e-14). If the percentage of common neighbours between two 
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nodes is 20%, the overall network use for a single node participating in the distribution of the 
filter can be estimated to approximately 83KB. Please note, this is the size of the information 
being transferred (the payload): the actual network use depends on implementation details 
(and in particular, on the chosen communication protocol and its parameters). This overhead is 
perfectly compatible even with networks with limited bandwidth, such as WSNs.
3. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed how a distributed network organisation could overcome many of the 
limitations and security challenges posed to networks deployed in difficult or hostile settings, 
such as during crises and conflicts. We analysed how onion routing can be used to secure 
communication under those circumstances. We also presented the limitations that the original 
design of onion routing and its most common implementation, Tor, have when used on distributed 
networks. In order to address these shortcomings, we proposed a number of modifications to 
the onion routing mechanism aimed at improving its resilience to a large coordinated offensive 
run by a hostile actor in a conflict scenario, such as a denial of service attack. In particular, we 
introduce novel mechanisms that allow relay information to be propagated across the network 
without requiring a directory structure, and we address the issue of the limited visibility among 
nodes of distributed networks. These results open the way to the deployment of onion-routing-
enabled networks in hostile environments, where centralised control is impossible.
A natural direction for future research would be an implementation of the proposed scheme, 
to provide experimental results on the overhead incurred by the distributed network for the 
exchange of the relay visibility information.
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